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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the structure of labor adjustment costs in relationship to the
dynamics of job and worker °ows. Using high frequency data, we document a previously
unsuspected degree of lumpiness in employment adjustment, which is characteristic of non-
convex adjustment costs. By means of the statistical analysis of duration data, we relate
that lumpiness to the structure of adjustment costs and not to the structure of shocks.
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Labor adjustment costs shape the pattern of employment adjustment. Depend-
ing on their structure, the employment path observed at the micro-level will be
di®erent. If adjustment costs are convex, adjustment is frequent but employment
variations in each period small. If, on the contrary, adjustment costs are non-
convex (e.g., linear or ¯xed), adjustment is rare and employment changes large.
In the latter case, but not in the former, inaction (i.e., the absence of adjustment)
may be optimal even if employment is not at its long-run equilibrium.
Distinguishing between these two polar structures of adjustment costs is a major
issue in the dynamic theory of labor demand (see Nickell, 1986; Hamermesh, 1993a;
Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). In fact, understanding the magnitude and structure
of adjustment costs is essential to the study of the cyclical behavior of employment
and the evaluation of job-security policies. Firing costs, in particular, have long
been at the center of the debates over Europe's unemployment problem.
In the literature the issue is typically addressed via the estimation of structural
models of labor demand that embed alternative structures of adjustment costs.
What we know from the few studies that follow in this approach (Hamermesh 1989,
1993b; Anderson 1993; Rota, 1994) is that non-linear labor demand models that
correspond to non-convex adjustment cost structures ¯t micro-data on employment
well and outperform alternative speci¯cations.
The fast growing literature on job and worker °ows (surveyed by Davis et al.,
1996) o®ers the opportunity to distinguish indirectly between competing hypothe-
ses about the structure of adjustment costs. Establishing the empirical properties
of job and worker °ows permits us to fully characterize the micro-level patterns of
employment adjustment and, subsequently, to compare these with those implied
by di®erent structures of adjustment costs.
There are multiple ways in which micro-level data on employment adjustment
can shed light on the underlying structure of adjustment costs.
First, non-convexities in the adjustment technology translate into the distri-
1bution of employment adjustment that is expected to exhibit a high proportion
of extreme events. Fixed or linear adjustment costs imply that micro-units ex-
perience episodes of sharp adjustment followed by relatively long periods of no
adjustment. Such a pattern of adjustment implies that a non-trivial share of ag-
gregate employment adjustment is accounted for by these extreme events, which
result in long fat tails of the employment change distribution.
Second, non-convex adjustment costs also imply that inaction is optimal even
outside equilibrium, which is contrary to what occurs if adjustment costs are con-
vex. The fact that establishments or ¯rms are inactive for a large number of
time-periods is an indication of the importance of one type of adjustment costs
over the other.
Evidence will be more conclusive if we can follow micro-units over time and
see how each period's adjustment record compares with the unit's entire record
over the sample period. If adjustment episodes are actually sharp and rare, and
action is most likely followed by inaction, then the observed pattern of employment
adjustment is consistent with non-convexities in the adjustment technology. If
adjustment is smooth and persistent, convex adjustment costs must be dominant.
However, in order to successfully attribute the observed pattern of employment
adjustment to one type of adjustment cost or to the other, it is essential to establish
that other factors (such as the structure of shocks themselves) are not behind what
we observe. If we do not observe the determinants of labor demand, this is feasible
only if data on the timing of employment adjustment are available.
It has been shown that the two alternative adjustment cost structures cou-
pled with di®erent patterns of shocks imply di®erently shaped hazard functions
(Power, 1994, Cooper et al., 1999). In particular, non-convex adjustment costs
with autocorrelated shocks imply that the conditional probability of adjustment
is increasing in the time elapsed since the previous adjustment episode, hence,
upward sloping hazards. Non-convex adjustment costs coupled with the absence
of a trend in the process governing the desired level of employment imply that the
probability of adjustment is independent of time, as do convex adjustment costs,
2as well. Hence, whereas °at hazards are not necessarily produced by convex ad-
justment technologies, upward sloping hazards unequivocally identify non-convex
adjustment costs.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the distinction between the two
alternative adjustment cost structures empirically, focusing on the observed prop-
erties of job and worker °ows. For this purpose, we rely on Portuguese data for two
reasons. First, the Portuguese labor market is an extreme case of high ¯ring costs
(OECD, 1999, Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). Second, suitably high-frequency
(quarterly) longitudinal data are available.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the dataset used is described.
The concentration of job and worker °ows and the frequency of inaction are an-
alyzed in Section 3. In Section 4 individual employment series are characterized
and the presence of spikes in those series is investigated. In Section 5, employment
regimes are de¯ned and transitions across regimes are described. In Section 6, the
statistical analysis of duration data is used to distinguish between the roles of the
structure of adjustment costs and the structure of shocks in shaping the observed
micro-level patterns of employment adjustment. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e D a t a
T h ed a t au s e di nt h i sa r t i c l ec o m ef r o mt h eInqu¶ e r i t oa oE m p r e g oE s t r u t u r a d o
(IEE) which is a survey run by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. The
IEE collects quarterly information on job and worker turnover at the establish-
ment level. Establishments of all sizes and in all industries are included.1 The
corresponding sample is drawn from the universe of the respondents to Quadros
de Pessoal (QP), which is an annual survey mandatory for all establishments with
wage earners.
The probability of units with fewer than 100 employees being selected to the IEE
sample is inversely related to the size of the establishment. Above that threshold,
1Only Agriculture, Fisheries, Public Administration and Private Services are excluded.
3establishments are selected with certainty.2 The sample is statistically representa-
tive for three-digit industries (as de¯ned by the SIC code), region and size class.
For this purpose, seven regions - ¯ve in mainland Portugal and the islands of
Madeira and the Azores - were considered and six size classes were de¯ned.
The dataset used here spans over twenty quarters, from the ¯rst quarter of 1991
until the last quarter of 1995. Units in the sample were selected from the 1990
QP ¯le. There are a total of 139,203 observations (establishments*quarters) in the
sample.
The original twenty quarterly ¯les were converted into two datasets that are,
hereinafter, referred to as the pooled dataset and the longitudinal dataset.
The pooled dataset simply pools all the twenty quarterly ¯les. No major mod-
i¯cations to the original ¯les were made except that all records (127) with zero
employment at both the beginning and end of period were deleted. The pooled
dataset contains 139,076 records corresponding to 10,673 establishments.
The longitudinal dataset results from merging the twenty quarterly ¯les. All
records in every quarterly ¯le have an identi¯cation code that is unique and does
not change during the whole period the establishment remains in the sample.
This code number served as the key for merging the two original ¯les. As a
result, an unbalanced panel of 10,673 establishments was obtained.3 This was
used to generate one balanced panel of 2,181 establishments for which information
is available in each and every one of the twenty quarters surveyed.
Quarterly measures of job °ows were computed using the end-of-period head-
count reported in two adjacent spells of the survey. The hiring and separation
rates were computed using the information on the total number of hirings and
separations reported by the respondent units in each spell of the survey. The
dataset also contains information on the end-of-period head-count by type of con-
tract. Combining this information with the establishment head-count permited us
to compute, for each establishment, the proportion of workers of the establishment
2This threshold is set at 50 employees for the Azores and Madeira regions.
3This is the number of establishments that were present in the sample at least once over the entire twenty-
quarter period.
4with ¯xed-term contracts and employed on a part-time basis, both of which are
used in Section 6.
3 The Distribution of Job and Worker Turnover
The conventional way of checking for the relative importance of smooth versus
lumpy adjustment patterns is to examine the distribution of net or gross job °ows
(see Boeri and Cramer, 1992).
Consider ¯rst the distribution of job creation and job destruction. In Figure 1
we depict the proportion of jobs created (destroyed) by establishments expanding
(contracting) at di®erent growth rate intervals (as measured in the horizontal
axis).4 The bars to the right of the origin correspond to job creation and those
to the left to job destruction. By design, smaller episodes of job creation and
destruction (those that imply an employment variation of as much as 10 percent)
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Figure 1: Distribution of Job Creation and Destruction (1991-95).
The height of these two columns indicates that establishments experiencing
mild employment changes account for about 30 to 34 percent of all job creation
4All job and worker °ows were computed according to the standard Davis and Haltiwanger de¯nitions (see
Davis et al., 1996). Over the sample period, quarterly job turnover (start-ups and shutdowns excluded) is equal
to 5.4 percent (2.3 for job creation and 3.1 for job destruction) and quarterly worker turnover is equal to 8.1
percent (3.7 percent for hirings and 4.5 percent for separations). For details, see Varej~ ao (2003).
5and destruction, respectively. The complement to this information is that, on both
margins, job °ows are concentrated in establishments that are going through sharp
employment changes: the share of job creation accounted for by establishments
expanding more than 10 percent (conventionally measured) is 70 percent, whereas
the corresponding ¯gure for job destruction is 66 percent. Concentration is slightly
greater for job creation than for job destruction, but both spread over the entire
range of employment growth rates.
The distribution of gross job °ows - hiring and separations - is represented in
Figure 2. The height of each column in this ¯gure measures the proportion of
all hirings (separations) that are accounted for by establishments hiring (¯ring)
workers at di®erent rates (measured on the horizontal axis). The height of the
two ¯rst columns in each panel indicates that only 34 percent of all hirings and 36
percent of all separations occur at establishments hiring or separating in a single
period the equivalent to less than 10 percent of its average workforce in the same
period. But the tails of both distributions also indicate that a non-trivial number
of establishments experience extreme episodes of hiring and ¯ring.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Hirings and Separations
6By design, establishments with stable employment are excluded from Figure
1, as are establishments reporting no hirings or separations excluded from Figure
2. The share of each type of establishment is, respectively, 74.7 percent, 83.7
percent and 80.6 percent, meaning that,on average, at least three quarters of all
observed units do not change employment, hire any worker or separate from any
of its workers over an entire quarter. This is clear evidence of the pervasiveness
of inaction at the micro-level.
Inaction pervasiveness and fat tails in the distribution of job °ows indicate how
important non-convex adjustment costs are. However, the concentration of these
very same distributions also documents the importance of convex adjustment costs.
Put di®erently, for both net and for gross employment °ows, strong evidence of
a pattern of adjustment consistent with a non-convex adjustment cost function
coexists with signs of smooth adjustment.
4 Spikes in Individual Employment Series
The distinctive characteristic of the pattern of employment adjustment implied by
non-convex adjustment cost structures is the presence of spikes - i.e. infrequent
moments of sharp employment adjustment - in the establishment-level employment
record.
Therefore, discriminating empirically between convex and non-convex adjust-
ment cost structures also implies an investigation of the importance of adjustment
spikes.
An appropriate way of doing this is to put each establishments adjustment
record in one quarter against the background of its entire record over the whole
sample period (twenty periods). If adjustment was lumpy, the employment record
over this period should have a few spikes, which, in the context of the whole period
of observation, would show as moments of sharp adjustment.
To check for the existence of these spikes we compute, establishment-by-establishment,
quarterly rates of turnover (net and gross). Three series for each unit in the panel
- one for the net employment change, another for the hiring rate and the third
7for the separation rate - are thus obtained. Each individual series is then ordered
from its highest value (rank 1) to the lowest (rank 20).5 If the employment se-
ries exhibits a few spikes, the ¯rst ranks of each individual series should be of
a magnitude greater than that of the remaining ranks. For example, if only one
spike occurred during the whole sample period, then rank 1 corresponds to the sole
period with a spike and will be much greater than rank 2 and all the subsequent
ranks, which, in this case, will not correspond to spikes. If no spikes occurred (as
we expect if adjustment costs are convex), then all the 20 ranks of each series will
be of a similar magnitude.










































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Net and Gross Employment Flow Rates, by Rank
5Here we follow the approach adopted by Doms and Dunne (1998) in their study of plant-level patterns of
capital accumulation.
8The next step is to compute, across establishments, the average of each rank.
It is the ¯gures thus obtained that are represented in the three panels of Figure 3.
What they tell us is, for example, for hiring rates, that the sharpest hiring episode,
which for di®erent plants may have occurred in di®erent calendar quarters, corre-
sponds to an average hiring rate of 18 percent (rank 1). The ¯gures corresponding
to the remaining ranks should be interpreted similarly, remmembering that rank
2 corresponds to the second sharpest espisode, and so on.
The purpose of constructing these series is to compare the magnitude of the
highest rank of each series (the highest and the lowest in the case of the net employ-
ment change series) to the remaining ranks. As discussed, the di®erence between
the highest and the second highest ranks in each series measures the relative im-
portance of the two sharpest adjustment episodes, large di®erences indicating the
presence of spikes and lumpy adjustment processes.
For the net employment change series the mean of rank 1 is 7.3 percent and
of rank 20 is -12.3 percent (Figure 3). This means that the greatest (least) net
employment change corresponds to 7.3 (-12.3) percent of the average employment
in the quarter in which the change occurred. Figure 3 also indicates that rank 1
is more than 70 percent higher than rank 2 and rank 19 is 66 percent higher than
rank 20. This indicates clearly that large episodes of net employment adjustment
are, indeed, extreme events in the history of employment adjustment of the indi-
vidual establishments. The pattern of employment adjustment these data convey
is consistent with non-convexities in the adjustment cost function.6
Evidence in favor of lumpy adjustment is even clearer with gross °ows. At its
maximum, the hiring rate represents about 18 percent of the establishments work-
force and this percentage drops o® signi¯cantly after rank 1. An even more pro-
nounced picture is obtained on the separations side. The average of the establishment-
level maximum separation rate rounds o® to 23 percent and it also drops o® sig-
ni¯cantly after rank 1.7
6When interpreting the mean values of the net employment change associated with each rank, it should be
remembered that some units may be expanding or shrinking throughout all of the 20 quarters surveyed, in which
case they arti¯cially reduce the mean value of each rank.
7The pattern of net employment adjustment depicted in Figure 3 could also imply that adjustment is lumpier
9Both hiring and separation rates are below 5 percent after rank 5 and remain
above zero until rank 20, indicating how infrequent even mildly large adjustment
episodes are.
5 Quarterly Transition Rates across Employment Regimes
The importance of large and infrequent episodes of employment adjustment was
documented in previous sections. However, if this pattern of adjustment is to
be attributed to non-convexities in the adjustment cost technology, it is essential
to also analyze the sequence of events. Convex adjustment costs imply that one
period of adjustment is followed by yet another period of adjustment, the intensity
of episodes decreasing over time. On their side, non-convex adjustment costs imply
that one period of adjustment is followed by periods of inaction.
To distinguish between these two adjustment patterns, all establishments in
each period were classi¯ed into one employment regime and their situation one
period ahead was recorded. Six alternative employment regimes as de¯ned in Table
1, were considered. This information was then used to compute the probabilities
of transition across regimes. With convex adjustment costs, we should observe
high probabilities of false transitions (transitions into the same regime). With
non-convex adjustment costs we should observe high probabilities of transition to
the inaction regime, which should be resilient.
Hence, the focus of our analysis is on the principal diagonal of the matrix of
probabilities of transition across employment regimes. High values on this diagonal
must be taken as signals of smooth adjustment, except for the cell corresponding
to the inaction regime. Signals of lumpy adjustment must show as high values in
the third column of the matrix, where the probabilities of transition from action
to inaction and of inaction persistence are documented.
Looking ¯rst at the main diagonal of the matrix in Table 1, it becomes clear
that with the exception of the expansion regimes (regimes 4 and 5), establishments
in cases of workforce reduction, although this would have to be controlled for by using data on the possible
asymmetry of shocks.
10Regime
Regime 1 2 3 4 5 6
1( ¢ E<0, H =0 ) 29.7 15.0 27.3 5.3 12.3 10.0
2( ¢ E<0, H>0) 21.0 34.0 7.3 7.3 7.2 23.2
3( ¢ E =0 , H =0 ) 14.5 1.9 70.0 3.2 8.5 2.0
4( ¢ E =0 , H>0) 20.7 15.5 24.9 11.2 13.0 14.8
5( ¢ E>0, S =0 ) 24.8 8.9 36.0 7.6 15.4 7.3
6( ¢ E>0, S>0) 15.1 30.0 7.3 7.4 8.9 31.4
Table 1: Transition Across Employment Adjustment Regimes.
in each regime are likely to be in that same state one period ahead. Expanding
establishments (regimes 4 and 5) will most likely move into the inaction regime
(regime 3). Seventy percent of all establishments that visit the inaction regime in
one quarter will still be in that same regime in the subsequent quarter.
Column three tells us that those establishments that make a true transition
move primarily to the inaction regime (the exceptions being transitions originating
in regimes 2 - employment declining, but hiring-, and in regime 6 - employment
declining but with separations).
The resilience of the inaction regime and, particularly, the importance of this
regime as a destination of all establishments that make a transition from one
quarter to the next are consistent with ¯xed adjustment costs. This result should
be emphasized as the regime de¯nition that has been used biases the results in
favor of smooth adjustment. Here, for an establishment to be classi¯ed as inactive,
not a single worker is allowed to move in or out of the establishment. Complete
inaction is even less likely because natural attrition, which is observed as a visit
to one action regime (regime 1 or 2), implies positive separations. 8
8Arguments in favor of using a relative criterion, as opposed to the absolute zero criterion used here to de¯ne
the inaction regime, can be found. Relative measures could be preferred if, as it is here, we cannot discriminate
between employer and employee-initiated separations. However, in a strict formulation, ¯xed adjustment costs
imply that the costs borne by the establishment by hiring/¯ring (expanding/contracting by) one worker are exactly
the same of larger similar actions. This is, of course, why we expect lumpy rather than smooth adjustment when
this strucuture of adjusmtent costs dominates.
116 A Duration Model of Employment Adjustment
6.1 Motivating the approach
The importance of establishment-level discrete patterns of adjustment was largely
documented in the previous sections. However, no link between the observed
micro-level adjustment pattern and the underlying structure of adjustment costs
has yet been established. So far, we have established only that the pattern of
employment adjustment observed is consistent with non-convex adjustment costs.
But we could not conclude that it is the result of non-convex adjustment costs
because other factors may be shaping what we observe. Shocks impacting estab-
lishments are the most obvious alternative explanation. Concern is that lumpy
adjustment processes re°ect a skewed distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, rather
than the structure of adjustment costs.9 Hence, it is essential for our purpose to
distinguish between these two causes.
The standard approach to this problem is to estimate structural labor demand
models with non-convex adjustment costs and see how they ¯t the data (and,
possibly, compare with the results obtained for models with alternative convex
adjustment cost structures).
An alternative approach focuses on the timing of employment adjustment, espe-
cially the time between two consecutive episodes of adjustment. Intuition is simple
and may be easily rationalized by a simpli¯ed (S,s) model which implies a micro-
level path of adjustment of the same type as the one resulting from non-convex
adjustment costs.
Assume, as in Caballero (1992), that at time t each individual establishment
i has a desired level of employment l¤
it, which, because of non-convex adjustment
costs, is not necessarily equal to the actual level of employment, lit.D e n o t eb ysit
the di®erence between desired and actual employment levels (sit = l¤
it-lit). With
non-convex adjustment costs, ¯rms adjust the employment level when sit hits
9Notice, however, that the observed pattern of adjustment cannot be reconciled with convex adjustment costs.
Convex adjustment technologies imply continuous adjustment activity and cannot match either the evidence of
pervasive inaction or the observed transience of action regimes.
12the upper or lower bounds of its inaction region (denoted, respectively, Si and
si). Assume further, that l¤
i is governed by a Brownian motion with drift ¹ and
instantaneous variance ¾2.
Under these assumptions, for each individual ¯rm, there is a probability density
function for the ¯rms location within its inaction regime. The exact shape of this
density function depends on the value of
¹
¾2 (for details, see Foote, 1998). Firms
adjust the level of employment whenever they hit one barrier control (Si or si),
which may occur either because they received a shock to l¤ great enough or because
they received a series of smaller shocks of the same sign. Such shocks change the
distance (sit) between a ¯rm's current location and the position of the inaction
bands.
Hence, in the non-convex case, the probability of employment adjustment de-
pends on how ¯rms approach the inaction band, if they actually do. If ¹ 6 =0
the probability of adjustment may be thought of as a positive function of time
elapsed since the previous adjustment, as each shock received brings the ¯rm a
little closer to one control barrier. 10 If ¹ = 0, the hazard function is constant and
the duration of the inaction regime is exponentially distributed.
Statistical duration analysis o®ers a methodology well-suited for distinguishing
the roles that non-convexities in the adjustment technology and the structure of
shocks play in shaping micro-level patterns of employment adjustment. Only if
adjustment costs are non-convex (and shocks are autocorrelated) can we expect
to see a positive relationship between the conditional (on time) probability of
adjustment and the duration of the no-adjustment period, that is, a positively
sloped hazard function. In all remaining cases no such relationship (positive or
negative) exists, and hazard functions are expected to be °at.11
10Higher values of ¾ reduce the probability that either control barrier is hit in each period.
11If adjustment costs are convex, inaction is not expected outside the steady-state. Starting from the equilib-
rium, the probability of adjustment depends only on receiving a shock, independently of its size. Hazard-functions
based approaches were used before in the study of micro-level patterns of investment (Power, 1994, Cooper et al.,
1999) and, with some modi¯cations, to describe the patterns of employment adjustment (Caballero et al., 1997).
The approach adopted here makes this study closer to the studies on investment than to the one on employment.
136.2 Estimation Procedure
The estimation of the hazard function, as applied to the context of employment
adjustment, starts with the de¯nition of the duration variable (t) that measures
the establishments time of stay in the inaction regime. For that purpose, a °ow-
sampling scheme was adopted. According to this scheme, each establishment is
selected upon entry to the inaction regime (at which point its individual clock is
set to zero) and followed until exit time. All units are observed over a ¯xed time
interval (from the ¯rst quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 1995). Hence, left
censoring is eliminated by construction, but right censoring may exist and must
be accommodated.
A useful concept in statistical analysis of a duration phenomenon is the hazard
function. In the study of inaction duration, the hazard function gives the instan-
taneous probability of adjusting employment at t, given that the establishment
stayed inactive until t
h(t) = lim
¢t!0









where f(t) is the probability density function, F(t) is the distribution function,


















which implies the following survival function:
S(t)=exp[¡(¸t)
½]( 5 )
14and the corresponding cumulative hazard function
¤(t)=( ¸t)
½ (6)
The Weibull distribution function is a natural choice since it allows a direct
test of duration dependence based solely on its shape parameter ½.A ½ param-
eter lower than 1 indicates negative duration dependence. Symmetrically, ½>1
implies monotonic increasing hazard rates through time. An exponential duration
distribution (and a constant hazard function) is implied by ½ =1 .
In this paper we shall also distinguish between two exit modes out of the inaction
regime: employment increase or decrease. Thus, we de¯ne cause-speci¯c hazard
functions to destination j
h(t)r = lim
¢t!0
(P(t · T<t+¢ t;R = r j T ¸ t)
¢t
(7)










where Sj(t)=e¡¤j(t) and ¤j(t)=
R t
0 hj(u)du.
The model has a conventional competing risks interpretation. In this frame-
work, a latent duration (Tj) attaches to each exit mode. We only observe the
minimum of each latent variable. If risks are assumed to be independent, with
continuous duration, this model simpli¯es to two separate single-cause hazard
models.
A common way to accommodate the presence of observed individual hetero-
geneity is to specify a proportional hazards model
h(t j x)=h0j(t)exp(x
0¯j) (10)
15where h0j(t) denotes the baseline speci¯c hazard function, that is, the hazard func-
tion corresponding to zero values for the covariates x. In this case, the covariates
a®ect the hazard function proportionally (i.e.
dh(x)
dxk = ¯kh(x) ). An implication of
this assumption is that the impact of the covariates does not change (in relative
terms) with the progression of the spell of inaction.
Our information on the elapsed duration of inaction is grouped into quarterly
intervals (while transitions can only be identi¯ed over a ¯xed interval of one quar-
ter). Let M = m denote the occurrence of an exit in a given month [ct¡1;c t], where
m is the realization of a discrete random inaction duration variable M 2 (1;:::;K).
The probability that an event occurs in the mth interval (i.e. that an exit occurs
over the course of the 3-month window), and that such an exit is to destination r,
will be given (neglecting, for the sake of parsimony, the t and x variables) by
fj(m)=
Sj(m ¡ 1) ¡ Sj(m ¡ 1)
Sj(m ¡ 1)
S(m ¡ 1) = hj(m)S(m ¡ 1): (11)
The functions fj(m)a n d[ 1¡ Sj(m)] provide a convenient characterization of
the probability density and the cumulative functions associated with the marginal
distribution for each latent duration, Tj , in terms of the speci¯c hazard function
hj(m). A censored observation (i.e. a spell of inaction that is still in progress
after the 3-month window) occurs with probability S(m)=
Q2
j=1 Sj(m),w h i c hi s
simply the product of the two speci¯c survivor functions.
With our sampling plan, where we collect the information of inaction duration
for the °ow of entrants into the inaction regime, the contribution of observation i












where µ is a vector of parameters that include regression coe±cients and baseline
hazard parameters, and ±mj is an indicator that assumes the value 1 if the individ-
ual exits to destination j during the mth interval, and 0 otherwise. The indicator
±m =
P2
j=1 ±mj identi¯es complete durations, so that 1¡±m equals 1 for a censored
16observation. The contribution to the likelihood function from a censored observa-
tion is simply the product of the two speci¯c survival terms (
Q2
j=1 Sj(m)), that is,
the probability of not exiting to either employment growth or employment decline.
We also attempt to accommodate the presence of unobserved individual hetero-
geneity by assuming, as conventional, a multiplicative error term associated with
each speci¯c hazard function
h(t j x)=h0j(t)exp(x
0¯j)vj (13)
We further assume that the errors vj are gamma distributed, with mean 1
and variance ¾2
j, and are uncorrelated across destinations (independent competing
risks).
We proceed by rede¯ning the speci¯c "survivor" function using the well-known




j (see Lancaster, 1990, p.66).






























Empirical implementation of the model implies a de¯nition of the no-adjustment
regime. There is no such obvious de¯nition. For that reason three alternative
criteria were used.12 These criteria are de¯ned as follows:
² Absolute zero threshold on net employment adjustment: the establishment is
classi¯ed as inactive if, during the period, there was no change in the level of
employment;
² Relative 10 percent threshold on net employment adjustment: the establish-
ment is classi¯ed as inactive if, during the period, the change in the level of
12An additional de¯nition setting a 2.5 percent threshold was also used but the corresponding results are not
reported as they do not di®er substantially from those corresponding to the ¯rst criterion listed here.
17employment is less than 10 percent of the employment count at the beginning
of the period;
² Collective dismissal criterion: the establishment is classi¯ed as inactive when-
ever its employment level varies by less than two or less than ¯ve depending
on whether the establishment employs fewer or more than ¯fty workers.13
The ¯rst criterion corresponds to the strictest de¯nition of inaction as applied
to net employment adjustment. This would be the most appropriate for investi-
gating the importance of, say, ¯xed adjustment costs, as these imply that the same
cost is borne independently of the number of individuals joining or leaving the es-
tablishment and of the size of the establishment itself. However, because data on
separations do not permit us to distinguish between ¯rings and other separations
(temporary separations, voluntary quits, retirements, or deaths) a relative thresh-
old - the second criterion - may also be adequate. Finally, the third criterion listed
follows the legal rule applying to the de¯nition of collective dismissals, which are
submitted to a number of obligations and imply considerably higher ¯ring costs
than those applying to individual dismissals.14
Being able to use alternative de¯nitions for the no-adjustment regime has the
obvious advantage of permitting us to contrast the corresponding predictions and
evaluate the sensitivity of the results to necessarily arbitrary thresholds.
6.3 Estimation Results
Results of ¯tting the duration model with no covariates added for the three alter-
native de¯nitions of the no-adjustment regime are depicted in Table 2.
The ¯rst result to notice is that, independently of how inaction is de¯ned, the
estimated values of the ¸ parameters of the Weibull distribution are low, indicat-
13The legal de¯nition applies to separations only. In the absence of an obvious corresponding criterion to apply
on the hiring margin, the option was to set the same absolute thresholds on this margin as well, and work with
an inaction region symmetric about zero.
14The Dismissals Act (Law 64-A/89) makes the distinction between individual and collective dismissals on the
grounds of the number of individuals being dismissed within a three month period. For a dismissal to be termed
collective and subject to the corresponding legislation, the law requires a minimum of two or ¯ve workers to be
dismissed simultaneously (i.e., within a three month period), depending on the ¯rm having fewer or more than
50 workers.
18Employment Expansion Employment Decline
Inaction (Absolute Zero Threshold)
coe±cient t coe±cient t
estimate statistic estimate statistic
¸ 0.036 27.506 0.052 39.718
½ 1.069 54.636 1.073 66.976
n 14710 14710
Log likelihood -8864.6 -12004.1
Inaction (10 percent Threshold)
¸ 0.011 13.802 0.015 17.777
½ 1.089 36.706 1.118 42.151
n 17121 17121
Log likelihood -5473.1 -6787.0
Inaction (Collective Dismissal Criterion)
¸ 0.015 17.968 0.021 24.055
½ 1.048 44.701 1.020 53.756
n 18123 18123
Log likelihood -7387.1 -10024.8
Table 2: Weibull Distribution Duration Model.
ing a low conditional probability of abandoning the no-adjustment regime. This is
consistent with the evidence discussed previously that documented a substantial
degree of inactivity and few quarterly transitions from inaction to action. Further-
more, low hazard rates are observed for the two exit modes: employment expansion
and decline. The probability of exiting the inaction regime is just slightly higher
in the case of the employment decline destination in comparison with employment
expansion. This is the ¯rst indication that the timing of employment adjustment
is fairly symmetric.
In all cases, the Weibull hazard function exhibits a positive duration depen-
dence. The estimated ½ parameters are always greater than one and, with one
exception, the hypotheses of constant hazard rates (½ = 1) are soundly rejected.
As explained above, this is clear evidence of the presence of non-convexities in the
adjustment cost function.
However, in this very stylized model the estimated shape parameters (of the
Weibull distribution) are barely above one. It is, in fact, well known from the
19duration analysis literature that failure to properly account for individual charac-
teristics biases the results towards negative duration dependence.
Control for individual speci¯c e®ects was, thus, implemented via the use of re-
gression analysis. A set of covariates contemporaneous to the timing of events was
added to the model. These covariates control for the size of the establishment (as
measured by the log of total employment) and for the proportion of workers with
¯xed-term contracts, and part-time contracts at the establishment level. Results
are reported in Table 3.
The estimated ½ parameters show that controlling for observed individual het-
erogeneity increases the slope of the hazard function, for all inaction regime def-
initions. Remarkably, the estimated ½ parameters suggest, again, that the shape
of the hazard functions is very similar across destination states. This is a second
indication of symmetry between employment expansion and decline.
Results in Table 3 further tell us that for all the criteria but the second, larger
¯rms are those facing the highest probability of exiting inaction (a one percent
increase in total employment increases the hazard rate by 0.51 to 0.80 percent).
However, it is interesting to look more carefully at the estimated coe±cient of
the log of employment in the second speci¯cation. Remember that this estimate
corresponds to the more demanding de¯nition of action for variations of employ-
ment as large as 10 percent of the beginning-of-period count, establishments are
still considered inactive according to this criterion. Put di®erently, it takes a net
employment variation as large as 10 percent of the beginning-of-period count for
an establishment to be considered as exiting the no-adjustment regime. What the
estimate of the employment coe±cient tells us is that larger establishments are
the least likely to exit the no-adjustment regime so de¯ned, although they are
more likely to do so for alternative inaction de¯nitions. This necessarily implies
that most of the action we observed among larger establishments corresponds to
relatively small adjustment episodes.
The proportion of the workforce with ¯xed-term contracts was included as a
regressor because costs of adjusting labor are lower if establishments employ tem-
20porary workers. To the extent that part-time work can also be considered, as it
usually is, as a contingent or °exible form of work, it is also appropriate to include
a variable measuring the proportion of part-time workers.
Results in Table 3 also indicate that the proportion of ¯xed-term contracts has,
indeed, a strong positive e®ect on the establishments conditional probability of
exiting inaction. Raising the proportion of temporary workers by one percentage
point increases the conditional probability of exiting the inaction regime between
0.9 and 1.8 percent, depending on the regime de¯nition and exit mode. The fact
that the largest estimates for the coe±cient of the ¯xed-term contract variable
were obtained when the most demanding de¯nitions of inaction (the 10 percent
employment threshold) indicates that ¯xed-term contracts are particularly instru-
mental in facilitating severe employment adjustment, which indicates that, to some
extent at least, they play the role of bu®er-stocks.
For the part-time variable, results indicate that part-time work either has no
statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the probability of adjusting employment or it has
a negative e®ect. This is contrary to what we would expect if establishments
employed workers on a part-time basis, because they are less costly to hire and
¯re, but is consistent with the fact that all of the existing legislation applying to
full-time work also applies to part-time work on the basis of the proportion of
normal full-time hours that part-timers work.
In an attempt to control for the conditions that initiated the current spell of
inaction, a dummy variable that indicates whether employment decline or employ-
ment expansion preceeded the current inaction episode was also included. No clear
pattern emerges from this exercise, suggesting that state dependence (generated
by persistent product demand shocks, for example) does not appear to play an
important role.
Finally, an attempt was made to control parametrically for the unobserved
individual heterogeneity assuming a gamma distributed error term (Table 4). This
estimation suggested that individual unobserved heterogeneity may be present in
¯ve regressions, further reinforcing the empirical evidence of increasing hazard
21rates. 15
7 Conclusions
If adequate matched employer-employee longitudinal data are available, it is pos-
sible to assess the relative importance of convex and non-convex adjustment cost
structures. Signs of both patterns of adjustment were investigated by checking the
importance of extreme events (jumps in employment processes), their frequency
and sequel. Unequivocal signs of discrete adjustment consistent with ¯xed ad-
justment costs were found at all these di®erent levels. Large employment changes
(larger than 10 percent of the establishments workforce) account for two-thirds of
total job creation and destruction, and also of all gross employment °ows. Inaction
is pervasive with 75 percent of all units surveyed not changing the level of employ-
ment over one quarter, and 72 percent also not hiring or ¯ring a single individual
over the same period. Visits to any regime implying some sort of adjustment are
frequently followed by a transition to the inaction regime, which emerges as highly
resilient.
Distinguishing between the e®ects of the pattern of shocks and those of the
structure of adjustment costs is essential for the purpose of this chapter. Statis-
tical analysis of duration data successfully permitted us to attribute the observed
pattern of employment adjustment to the underlying structure of adjustment costs,
not to shocks. If individual heterogeneity is properly accounted for, the hazard
function (de¯ned as the instantaneous conditional probability of abandoning the
inaction regime) is unmistakably upward sloping. This indicates that there is a
non-convex component to the adjustment cost technology and that it is important
enough to shape the whole process of adjusting employment. This result survives
changes in the de¯nition of the inaction regime.
Independently of the regime de¯nition used, the proportion of workers with
15Alternatively, individual heterogeneity was also controlled for by the establishments pre-sample history of
employment adjustment (Blundell et al., 1995). Results of estimating the model accounting for each establishments
previous labor market history (not reported here) further reinforced the indication of increasing hazard function.
The downside of this approach is that eight cross sections of observations are lost for estimation.
22¯xed-term contracts emerged as a major determinant of the micro-level conditional
probability of a transition from the inaction regime to one implying some sort of
adjustment. Establishments with a larger share of temporary workers have a higher
probability of abandoning the inaction regime. This result highlights the fact that
the existence of low-¯ring-cost contracts in°uences the way employers respond to
shocks on both margins.
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25Employment Expansion Employment Decline
Inaction (Absolute Zero Threshold)
coe±cient t coe±cient t
estimate statistic estimate statistic
Employment (log) 0.650 34.643 0.806 51.486
Fixed-term contracts (% of total) 1.153 9.898 0.925 8.656
Part-time workers (% of total) -0.560 -2.545 -0.205 -1.158
From employment declining regime 0.084 1.848 0.067 1.794
¸ 0.081 20.173 0.103 26.230
½ 1.480 54.687 1.571 68.440
industry and year dummies present
number of observations 14710 14710
Log likelihood -7944.5 -10157.3
Inaction (10 percent Threshold)
Employment (log) -0.205 -9.033 -0.129 -6.530
Fixed-term contracts (% of total) 1.520 10.545 1.819 14.821
Part-time workers (% of total) -0.119 -0.451 0.414 1.953
From employment declining regime 0.323 4.854 -0.095 -1.638
¸ 0.035 12.101 0.036 13.277
½ 1.340 36.414 1.357 41.786
industry and year dummies present
number of observations 17121 17121
Log likelihood -5169.3 -6424.3
Inaction (Collective Dismissal Criterion)
Employment (log) 0.512 21.701 0.688 33.612
Fixed-term contracts (% of total) 1.674 12.409 1.712 13.965
Part-time workers (% of total) 0.257 0.854 0.938 3.858
From employment declining regime -0.037 -0.663 0.051 1.116
¸ 0.042 14.953 0.045 17.978
½ 1.348 44.544 1.400 54.654
industry and year dummies present
number of observations 18123 18123
Log likelihood -6831.9 -8788.6
Table 3: Regression Model Estimates (Weibull distribution) .
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Inaction (Absolute Zero Threshold)
coe±cient t coe±cient t
estimate statistic estimate statistic
Employment (log) 0.650 34.640 1.263 30.332
Fixed-term contracts (% of total) 1.153 9.898 1.928 9.582
Part-time workers (% of total) -0.560 -2.545 -0.509 -1.844
From employment declining regime 0.084 1.849 0.027 0.422
Constant -3.717 -48.533 -4.175 -38.774
¾ 0.036 1.000 1.989 20.355
½ 1.480 54.684 2.564 27.695
industry and year dummies present YES YES
number of observations 14710 14710
Log likelihood -7944.4 -9986.34
Inaction (10 percent Threshold)
Employment (log) -0.340 -7.327 -0.227 -5.853
Fixed-term contracts (% of total) 2.654 7.848 3.242 10.193
Part-time workers (% of total) 0.039 0.084 1.250 2.728
From employment declining regime 0.758 5.817 -0.217 -2.078
Constant -4.714 -27.045 -4.982 -28.957
¾ 4.241 9.794 3.817 10.912
½ 2.076 13.710 2.141 14.891
industry and year dummies present YES YES
number of observations 17121 17121
Log likelihood -5138.8 -6378.3
Inaction (Collective Dismissal Criterion)
Employment (log) 0.768 14.280 0.874 23.784
Fixed-term contracts (% of total) 2.823 8.598 2.191 11.244
Part-time workers (% of total) 0.025 0.047 -0.002 -0.009
From employment declining regime 0.023 0.234 0.024 0.363
Constant -4.487 -28.499 -4.595 -41.373
¾ 3.780 10.251 2.019 12.702
½ 2.230 13.227 1.877 24.501
industry and year dummies present YES YES
number of observations 18123 18123
Log likelihood -6787.63 -8752.34
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